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COMMERCIAL PURCHASING:
THE CHASM BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S
EVOLVING POLICY AND PRACTICE
Steven L. Schooner1
1. Introduction
During the 1990’s, the  United Sta tes (U.S.) government accelera ted its
efforts to  adopt more commercial practices and buy more commercial items .  This
entailed two related behavioral changes .  First, the U.S. government touted its
willingness to mimic the most success ful buying practices of bus inesses and
consumers.  Second, the U.S. government committed to relying more heavily upon
existing goods and services already produced in the marketplace, rather than
demanding that firms create government-unique versions of similar goods and
services.2 
Thus, the commercial buying trend introduced two seemingly ephemeral
concepts into the  mains tream vocabulary of U.S. procurement personne l:
acquisition of commercial items (a focus on purchasing different things) and
3 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.
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commercial purchasing practices (a focus on different purchasing methodologies). 
For the purposes of the U .S. procurement system, the term “commercial item”
today refers to “any item . . . that is of a type customarily used for
nongovernmenta l purposes  and that [h]as  been so ld, leased, or licensed to the
general public[.]”3 As discussed be low, the intent of this regulatory definition is to
distinguish commercial items from those unique goods (such as sophisticated
weapons systems) procured by the government, typically manufactured to
idiosyncratic specifications, for which no legitimate nongovernmental market
exists.  For example, the now-popular term “commercial-off-the-shelf” (or COTS)
refers to those goods readily available to the public in the retail marketplace,
frequently through catalogue orders or cash-and-carry transactions.
Turning from what the government is buying to how the government buys,
the government’s adoption of the term “commercial purchasing practices” reflects
the government’s  attempt both to: (1) act more like  a consumer or a for-profit
business; and (2) avoid buying according to the long-established statutes,
regulations, policies, and practices that encompass the federa l government
procurement regime.
Change of this magnitude is difficult, and it frequently leads to  missteps and
meets resistance from policymakers, procurement personnel, and entrenched
government suppliers.  Nonetheless, the trend continues.
4 Many observers point to the recent, meteoric rise of Dell Computer – a
commercial vendor of personal computers and peripherals – through the ranks of
the Top 200 Government Contractors as an anecdotal success story.
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This paper introduces the  U.S. e fforts to make its government purchasing
regime more commercial.  These efforts entail the introduction of new policies,
vocabulary, purchasing authorities, and practices.  The paper then unveils a host of
impediments that restrain the U.S.  government from evolving into a truly
commercial purchasing regime.  These impediments derive from the nature of
government, the  specific needs of the government, and public’s expec tations
regarding the expenditure of public funds.   Ultimately, the paper sugges ts that the
U.S. government is well served in its efforts to become more commercial, but
divining a happy medium – or determining just how commercial to become – is a
daunting task.
2. The United States: Adopting Commercial Behavior
As sugges ted above, there are various aspects o f the government’s  effort to
embrace commercial behavior, ranging from the conceptual to the concrete,
including principles, practices and p latitudes.  For the  sake of this brief discussion,
the author suggests that the following elements of the commercial purchas ing
movement merit discussion.   First, as  a matter of po licy, the government
articulated – and regulated – a preference for the procurement of commercial items. 
Second, the government enhanced its efforts to identify, attract, and select
commercial contractors.4  Third, the government today utilizes many putative
5  Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of
41 U.S.C. and 10 U.S.C.). This preference is bolstered by the regulatory order of
precedence language in 48 C .F.R . § 12.102: “ When a policy in another part of this
chapter is inconsistent with a policy in this part, this Part 12 shall take precedence
for the acquisition of commercial items.”
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commercial-type contractual vehicles.  As discussed below, this topic is a mixed
bag.  The government unequivocally has benefited from the adoption of certa in
commercial purchasing vehicles (such as the garden variety credit card), but it has
also spawned a number of bastardized, troublesome vehicles in the name of
commercial practice.  Fourth, the government reduced barriers to entry for
commercial firms, specifically by (a) avoiding government-unique standards,
specifications,  provisions, and clauses  and (b) reducing certain intrusive
government-unique pricing, audit, and certification requirements.  Fifth, the
government increased its emphasis on privatization and outsourcing of commercial
functions.  While the author concedes that this organizational scheme is somewhat
artificial, it should provide a sufficient entrée into the government-commercial
realm.
2.1. Clarifying the Preference for Commercial Items
The preference for commercial items and commercial practices, codified by
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA),5 has led to the U.S.
government’s  use of a number of different contractual vehicles.  But before turning
to these new prac tices, it seems appropriate to briefly discuss the underlying
6 Proponents asserted that combining success ful commercial practices with the
elimination of government unique barriers would make the procurement system
more efficient.  See generally Kelman, supra note 2, at 250.
7 See AL GORE, BUSINESSLIKE GOVERNMENT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
AMERICA’S BEST COMPANIES 3 (October 1997) (featuring the popular DILBERT
comic strips by Scott Adams).  Readers unfamiliar with DILBERT will enjoy
visiting <http://www.unitedmedia.com/comics/d ilbert/>.
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policies and examine some of the new vocabulary utilized in the government-
commercial purchasing regime.
2.1.1. Articulating the Policy of the Commercial Preference
As discussed above, the rallying cry of the commercial movement was that
the U.S. government should study, learn from, and ultimately imitate the most
successful buying practices of businesses and consumers.6
Our models, teachers, and partners in this historic undertaking
are America ’s bes t-run companies  – companies that led the
quality revolution of the past two decades . . . which have kept
America competitive in the world market.  They have already
been through the  transformation from industrial-age  to
information-age management.  They have been through the
learning curve, they have made the mis takes and fixed them, all
while dealing with the risks of a free market. . . . 
Most of what successful businesses, and now government, have
learned can be summed up in two principles: focus on
customers, and listen to workers.  Old-fashioned bureaucracies
focus on hierarchy and listen to instructions from the top. 
Doing otherwise is a big change.7
While this rhetoric may resemble cheerleading, these types of proclamations,
delivered by high-rank ing government officials, sent s trong messages to
8 VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, THE BEST KEPT SECRETS IN GOVERNMENT 14
(September 1996).
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procurement personnel: changed behavior was required in the post-acquisition
reform environment.
At the same time, the government has committed itself to relying more
heavily upon the existing goods and services produced in the marketplace. 
Specifically, this means that the government is attempting to break its longstanding
habit of demanding that firms create government-unique versions  of goods and
services available in the commerc ial marketplace .  For example, in 1996, the
government touted its purchase of T-shirts as  a break through because the
government bought Jockey’s standard product, rather than mandating that
manufacturers produce a shirt to unique government specification and provide
sensitive pricing data so that the government could determine a fair price.8
As discussed below, however, a critical observation of the post- acquisition
reform regime discloses a noticeable rift between policy and practice.  W here the
government practice aligns well with the underlying policies, the government,
private firms, and the  public appear to benefit.  Where the  government stre tches the
lessons learned from the commercial marketplace, or contorts the commercial
experience  to achieve specific objec tives, the results have proven less appealing.
9 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which has been adopted, with minor
modifications, by the legislatures in all fifty of the United States, and is addressed
at length below, provides some useful analogies.  The drafting committee
respons ible for revising Article 2, which deals with sales of goods, confronted the
problem that definitions often need to be somewhat amorphous in order to be
sufficiently broad to cover the relevant field.  The UCC’s merchant definition has
been criticized  as a “wonderland of exotic words which may be a delight to the
lovers of intricate semantics, but which will rise to plague any lawyer, businessman
or judge who attempts to apply such a statute to regulation of everyday
transactions." Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a
Problem in Codification, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 141, 148  (1951).  Further,
the current code, in defining its scope, refers s imply to “transactions in goods ,” but
did not address whether computer information falls within that definition.  This
ambiguity led courts to apply article 2 to computer information transactions “either
directly or by ana logy, in ways that lead to inappropriate results.” Ann Lousin,
Symposium on Revised Article 1 and Proposed Revised Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Proposed UCC 2-103 of the 2000 Version of the Revision of
Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 913 (SPRING 2001).
10 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.
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2.1.2. Introducing a New Vocabulary
Developing meaningful definitions for the language of this new commercial
regime has proven challenging.9  This is not surprising given the inherent
confusion assoc iated with two similar sounding, arguably re lated, but conceptua lly
dist inct e fforts  – the  purchase of more commerc ial items and the effort to engage in
more commercial behavior.
The  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) expanded the regulatory
definition of commercial items aiming to include anything available in the
marketplace that was not deve loped exc lusively for the Federal government.10  The
primary definitional message became: if the item is customarily used for a
nongovernmenta l purpose and the public consumes the item,  whether through
11 See generally  48 C.F.R. § 2 .101.  
12  48 C.F.R . § 2.101 (emphasis added).
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purchase, lease , or license,  the item is commerc ial.11 In the effort to maximize the
government’s flexibility, however, the scope of the commercial item definition
became staggeringly broad.  The definition includes items that have been “offered”
but not yet ac tually sold to the public; any item that evolves from a commercial
item; nondevelopmental items that were developed exclusively at private expense
and sold to multiple sub-Federal governments; and any commercial item that has
experienced certain “minor modifications.”  The regulations describe these types of
modifications as follows:
Minor  modifications o f a type not customarily  availab le
in the commercial marketplace made to meet Federal
Government requirements. Minor modifications means
modifications that do  not significantly alter the
nongovernmental function or essential physical
characte ristics of an item or component, or change the
purpose  of a p rocess . Factors to  be considered in
determining whether a modification is minor include the
value and size  of the modification and the  compara tive
value and size  of the final product. Dollar values and
percentages may be used as guideposts, but are not
conclusive evidence that a modification is minor. . .  .12
Professor Steven Kelman, formerly Administrator for Federal Procurement
Policy, applauds this “move away from government-unique specifications and
standards towards broad needs descriptions that enable vendors to offer a wide
variety of commercial solutions[.]”  He argues that government unique-
specifica tions  unintentionally disqualify many competent potentia l offerors and, in
13 Kelman, “Buying Commercial” supra note 2, at 251.
14 See Department of Labor, Contracting for Commercial Items, (July 21,
2001), available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/oasam/public/regs/statutes/comlitem.htm.  See also James
W. Brown and James E. Shipley, Defense Commercial Pricing Management
Improvement: Back to the Commercial Acquisition Reform Drawing Board 18 J.L.
& COM. 31 (Fall, 1998) (suggesting that the commercial item definition is too
broad,  which may lead  to inclusion of items (a) that a re not truly commerc ial and
(2) lack prices determined by market forces).
15 10 U.S.C. §  2371.  Other transactions were deve loped to “ attract to the
defense marketplace  commercial concerns with leading edge technologies who
were generally unable or unwilling to comply with DOD-unique requirements” See
generally <http://www.abm.rda.hq.navy.mil/bptrans.cfm> explaining that: “Other
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so doing, substantially limit the “government’s ability to secure the best match
between government needs and marketplace capabilities.”  Kelman suggests that
the revised regulations permit agencies to describe their needs in broad terms,
which allows private firms to “rely on existing product literature and propose more
than one product,” resulting in lower offered prices.13
Less enthus iastic observers fret over the  broad scope of the definitions and
complain that these terms frequently seem amorphous.  Critics suggest that the
current definition of commerc ial item is so broad , that almost a ll government
contracts  could be considered  commercial.  The “internal . . .  joke [posits] that the
only items not cons idered commercial items under the  new definition are the
Seawolf submarine and the B-2 Stealth bomber. . . .”14  These criticisms are fuelled
by the recognition that, included under the umbrella of commercial items is the
“other transactions” authority, which entails the procurement of cutting-edge,
frequently large-scale, research and developmental work.15
transactions are agreements used for research and prototype projects that a re
principally defined in terms of what they are not. They are not a contract, grant, or
cooperative agreement. To the extent that a sta tute or regulation is limited in its
applicab ility to the use of a contract,  grant or cooperative agreement, it genera lly
does not apply to an other transaction.  For example, the Contracts Disputes Act
and the Federal Acquisition Regulation do not apply to other transactions.”
16  48 C.F.R. § 2.101.
17 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.  Established catalogues and market prices are discussed at
48 C.F.R. § 15.804-3.
18 This has led to a push for regulations including additional contract types such
as time-and-materials and labor-hour. But see The New Commercial Acquisition
Rules, availab le at <http://www.ffhsj.com/cmemos/00f4143> (“[The exclusion of
services sold at hourly rates] would seem to be a conscious choice of the regulation
writers, not to import the special restrictions on commercial services conta ined in
the commercial item rules into the new rules governing the TINA exceptions for
adequate p rice competition and established catalog or market price.” ).
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Similar concerns arise with regard to the definition of commercial services. 
The first category of commercial services includes installation, maintenance,
repair, training, and other service in support of commercial items.16 In contrast,
stand-alone commercial services, which must be based on established catalogue or
market prices, are:
Services of a  type  offered and sold competitively in
substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace
based on established catalogue or market prices for
specific tasks performed under standard commercial
terms and conditions. . . .17
The definition,  however, precludes, among other things, services sold a t hourly
rates for unspecified tasks.18
To genera te momentum for these new efforts, the procurement regulations
direct acquisition officials to “define requirements in terms that enable and
19 48 C.F.R. § 11.002. 
20 See also The New Commercial Acquisition Rules, available at
<http://www.ffhsj.com/cmemos/00f4143> (“Requirements must be defined so that
commercial items (or NDI if commercial items are not available) can fulfill those
requirements .”)  The preference for NDI’s may have the  effec t of “significantly
expanding the government’s ability to acquire cutting-edge technology from
commercial companies.”
21 See  48 C.F.R . § 12.301(e); (f).
22 Carl L. Vacketta & Susan H. Pope, Commercial Item Contracts: When is a
Government Contract Term or Condition Consistent with “Standard” or
“Customary” Commercial Practice? 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 291, 301-306 (1998) 
(“this failure raises the  concern tha t a federal agency or one of its [contracting
officers] may conclude that a term or condition is consistent with customary
commercial practice based upon merely isolated or anecdotal information rather
than upon mere  substantiated industry research and s tatistical analysis of its
usage”).  The FAR drafte rs “created a ‘ tailoring’ mechanism by w hich a  CO could
alter, add to, or delete form the nineteen ‘core’ terms and conditions to reflect more
accurately that which is ‘customary’ in the particular industry.” Ibid. at 298. 
Conversely, the FAR “limits the CO’s ability to tailor” by prohibiting contracting
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encourage offerors to supply commercial items”19 and, to the  maximum extent
practicable, acquire non-developmental items to meet agency needs.20 
Accordingly, agencies now enjoy broad discretion to determine whether or not
supplies, services, and nondevelopmental items are consistent with the FAR Part
12 commercial definitions.21
With regard to purchasing practices,  the new vocabulary a rises primarily in
the context o f the new vehicles  or mechanisms , discussed below .  But even the
absence of new language could not insulate the new policy from criticism. 
Observers are quick to point out tha t neither the enab ling legislation nor the
regulations define the “ standard” or “customary” commercial prac tices intended  to
serve as a model for government behavior.22
officers from tailoring those contract terms and conditions tha t “implement
statutory requirements” and  those terms  and conditions that are “ inconsistent with
customary commercial practice without first going through a written waiver
process  set up by the contrac ting agency[.]” Ibid. at 298-299.
23 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-545, pt. 2, at 104  (1993).
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2.2. Attracting and Utilizing Commercial Firms
One of the primary justifications for the commercial movement derived from
the widely held belief that many government unique  aspec ts of the procurement
system have made selling to the government unattractive to commercial entities. 
Firms are hesitant to sell commercial products to the federal government because
of the complex web of procurement requirements (whether deriving from laws,
regulations, policies, or practices).  They fear the requirements related  to tracking
and disclos ing cost data  and other financial information, in conjunction with the
government’s broad audit rights, can lead to costly missteps.  They are intimidated
by scores of government unique  terms and conditions and daunted by the  prospects
of granting unlimited rights to the government in their technical and proprietary
data.  Many of these concerns derive from established government practices that
are uncommon in, and perceived as untenable by, the private sector.”23
Accord ingly, one of the most difficult aspects of the government’s efforts to
adopt commercial practices and strategies was the elimination of the barriers that
dissuaded commerc ial firms from entering the government market.  The
government’s  most successful efforts in this regard w ere: (1) reduc ing and
eliminating government-unique financial record keeping and reporting (or
24 Kelman, supra note 2, at 250-253.
25 The government has not completely eliminated the audit rights that
traditionally deterred  businesses from entering into contracts with the government.
See 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-5(d)(1) (the government retains the right to examine a
contrac tor’s “directly pertinent records involving transactions re lated to this
contract” ); 48 C.F.R. § 15.402(a)(1), (2); 15.403-1; 15.403-3(b) (granting
contracting officers the  discretion to obtain pricing information in order to
determine price reasonableness when adequate  competition is lacking).
26  See,e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-1 (public relations and advertising costs)
through 31.205-51 (costs of alcoholic beverages).
27 See 48 C.F.R. 52.215-2 (audit of books and records).  One of the partial
success of the commercial acquisition effort were the expanded exemptions from
Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), 10 U.S.C. § 2306a; 41 U.S.C. § 254b; 48 C.F.R.
§ 15.4 . TINA requires the submission of cos t and pricing data  during the
negotiation of large, negotiated contracts unless  certain exceptions (including the
procurement of commercial items) apply.  The new TINA exemptions  also  limit
the extent of the government’s access to business records.  See 48 C.F.R. § 52.215-
41(a)(2). 
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disclosure) requirements; (2) e liminating numerous contractor certifications and
representations; and (3) reducing its reliance upon government-unique
specifications and standards.24
Government-unique accounting requirements frequently head the list of
maladies that p revent commercial businesses from contrac ting with the
government.25  These requirements prohibit reimbursement of many commonly-
incurred costs of doing business (such as advertising, alcohol, and lobbying),26
grant the government substantial access to  contractors’ accounting books  through
disclosure and audit,27 and typically lead to  the estab lishment of government
unique record-keeping.  Moreover, businesses that run afoul of the complex
requirements  find themselves subject to  severe criminal and civil sanctions (in
28 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
29 Although changes  to TINA eliminated many of the barriers to attrac ting and
utilizing firms, “most favored customer” pricing remains a major concern. See
generally  Richard J. Wall and Christopher B. Pockney, Revisiting Commercial
Pricing Reform 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 315, 326 (1998)  (Most favored customer
prices are risky for contractors. “A large commercial company might never be sure
of what constituted the best deal, thus running the risk of violating the broad scope
of disclosure obligations covering best discounts and greatest concessions.”)  I
reject, however,  the contrac tor community’s broader assertions regarding the
apocalyptic impact of the False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions.  Specifically, I do
not perce ive the False Claims Act as a  significant barrier to entry with regard to
firms’ willingness to do any business at all with the federal government. I am
unpersuaded that any significant number of commercial firms refuses to do
business with the government based solely upon fear of the False Claims Act.  As
my colleague, Professor Bill Kovacic concedes, “ it would be an exaggeration to
say that . . .  oversight, standing alone, commonly induces firms to deal solely in the
commercial arena.  It is doubtful that any single attribute of the procurement
regula tory system has that d iscouraging e ffect.” William E. Kovacic, The Civil
False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in Government Procurement
Markets 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 239 (1998)  (emphas is added) (suggesting
that contrac tors regard  this “overs ight as a cos tly, substantial burden of doing
business with the government”).
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addition to nightmarish media scrutiny).  Contractors often complain that the
rapidly escalating sanctions of the Civil False Claims Act (FCA),28 which may be
imposed for incomplete or inaccurate disclosure, represent a significant, if not
insurmountable, barrier to private firm participation in government contracts.29 
Accordingly, the revised practices attempt to exempt commercial firms from these
record-keeping, disclosure, and audit requirements when they provide commercial
items or services to the government. 
Professor Kelman expected that “ reducing reporting requirements and
relying more on competition as an alternative to more traditional forms of
30 Kelman, supra note 2, at 252.
31 Ibid. at 254 n. 11 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-222, pt. 1, at 48 (1995)).
32 48 C.F.R. §§  14.201-1,15.204-1. 
33 Pub. L. No.  104-106, § 4301(b); 62 Fed. Reg. 233 (January 2, 1997).
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oversight (such as audits)  should also significantly enhance the government's
ability to rely on the commercial marketplace.”30  He argued  that government-
unique audit rights are unnecessary when utilizing commercial practices because
the “purchase of a commercial item logically lends itself to simplified procedures
because there exists  a yardstick  in the commercial marketplace against which to
measure price and product quality and to  serve as  a surrogate  for government-
unique procedures.”31
The government also historically required  that contrac tors sign numerous
representations and certifications prior to, or at the time of, contract agreement. 
Collected  in section K of the uniform contract format,32 these “reps and certs,” as
they are commonly known,  required contractors to  acknow ledge that, among many
other things, they qualify as a small business ; comply with applicable employment,
labor, and environmental laws; will deliver an end product manufactured primarily
in the U.S.; and have not disclosed their pricing to their competitors, offered
gratuities or kickbacks,  or been convicted of ce rtain offences.  In response , the
Clinger-Cohen Act mandated the elimination of the lion’s share of these
representation and certification requirements.33  Despite significant improvement, a
daunting consolidated list of representations and certifications remains for
34 48 C.F.R. §§ 12.301(b)(1), 52.212-3.
35 48 C.F.R. § 12.301; General Services Administration, White Paper:
Acquisition Sources and Alternatives (August 1998) [hereinafter GSA,  White
Paper], available at <http://www.itpolicy.gsa.gov/mke/acqwp.htm>. 
36 Memorandum from William N. Gormley, CPPO Assistant Commissioner,
Office o f Acquis ition to FSS Contracting Activities (FC Distribution Lis t)
(February 26, 1999) <http://www.dsp .dla .mil/policy/FC-99-3.html>.
37 48 C.F.R . §§ 12.101(a), (b).
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commercial contractors.34  The reforms a lso eliminated or modified many non-
essentia l (but  by no  means all) provisions and clauses and made certa in
government unique laws inapplicable to commercial item acquisitions.35 
Further, plenty of commercial firms hesitated to pursue government business
because of the numerous unique specifications that permeate government contracts. 
Humorous anecdotes abound of government-unique recipes for fruitcakes, detailed
descriptions of lead pencils, or complex requirements for manufacturing ashtrays. 
Proponents of acquisition reform c laim that, “acquiring Government-unique  items
often engenders higher costs, increased Government design risk, and greater
potentia l for obso lescence…[because] the G overnment often pays for all
production costs including added set up charges, special tooling and any research
and development costs. Products take a much longer time to acquire than those
commercial items that are readily available ‘off-the-shelf’.”36  As a result, the
current regulations make clear that the buyer is expected to conduct market
research to determine whether commercial items could meet the agency’s
requirements and acquire commercial items when they are available.37
38 48 C.F.R. § 12.202.
39 See 48 C.F.R. § 12.207 (“Agencies shall use firm-fixed-price contracts or
fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment for the acquisition of
commercial items.”)  The FAR also permits agencies to use indefinite-delivery
contracts where the prices are established based on a firm-fixed-price or fixed-
price with economic price adjustment. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.5.
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The description . . . must contain sufficient detail for
potential offerors of commercial items to know which
commercial products or services may be suitable. . . .
[The agency should] describe the type of product or
service to be acquired and explain how the agency
intends to use  the produc t or service in terms  of function .
. ., performance requirement[,] or essential
characteristics. . . . [This] allows offerors to propose
methods tha t will best meet the  needs of the
Government.38
2.3. Reliance on Commercial Contractual Vehicles
Ultimately, however, the most visible manifestation of the commercial
regime is the proliferation of new or revised contractual vehicles that have been
deemed consistent with commercial practice.  These range from common sense
application of commonly available  tools – such as credit  cards or electronic
catalogues – to sophisticated vehicles that allegedly follow private sector
examples.
2.3.1.  Contract Pricing: A Threshold Issue
Examining the types of contracts employed by the  government highlights
some of most difficult issues to reconcile in the discussion of commercial
purchasing.  As a matter of policy and regulation, when acquiring commercial
items, agencies generally must use firm-fixed price contracts.39 In conventional
18
fixed-price contracting, if a contractor fulfils its contractual promise for less than
the contract  price, the contractor realizes a p rofit.   (The  contrac tor’s profit is
calculated by subtracting its incurred costs from its contract price.)  If performance
proves more costly to the  seller than the contract price,  the seller suffers a loss. The
government’s use of fixed-price vehicles for commercial purchasing makes sense
because fixed-price contracts are most appropriate where performance risk is low. 
Performance  risk should be  low when the government seeks to  procure things
currently available in the commercial marketplace, whether office furniture,
persona l computers,  or telephone  service (where the government agrees  to pay a
fixed-price for each minute of telephone usage, whether local or long distance). 
If a company manufactures and widely advertises for sale its product or
service, consumers might reasonably conclude that, barring unanticipated
contingencies, the company is capable of delivering the promised goods or services
on time for the price offered.   Moreover,  unless the  government buys in unusually
large quantities, the  seller’s price  is determined by the seller’s assessment of the
market value of the item or service (or, in other words what reasonable business
people or consumers are willing to pay), rather than isolated negotiations between
the seller and the  government buyer (in which the price is determined by the
seller’s projected cost of performing the contract).  
Yet, frequently, the government obtains goods and services for which no
market of consumers or businesspeople exist.  In the absence of a market
40 These contracts are structured so that profit or fee can be calculated
independent of the contractor’s incurred costs.  See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 16.306.
41 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-20.
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mechanism to set prices, and particularly where the manufacturer or seller lacks
sufficient p roduction or marketing information or experience to set  a reasonable
price, the government employs  a cost re imbursement contracting mechanism.   The
cost reimbursement mechanism, which obligates the government to reimburse the
contractor for its reasonable costs  to perform the contract,40 eliminates the
contractor’s risk that performance w ill become prohibitively expensive.  (At the
same time, the  government assumes the risk  of cost overruns, which it attempts to
control to some extent by utilizing various long-standing tools, such as the
Limitation of Costs Clause.41)
The correlation between commercial contracting and contract type selection
quickly devolves  into circular reasoning.  Reform advocates  suggest that the
government, whenever possible, should purchase commercial items or services. 
Pursuant to the regulations, commercial items can only be purchased using fixed-
price contracts.  This should pose no problem because these items should already
have been developed outside of the government marketplace,  and the government
should find (when it ente rs the marke tplace) that savvy consumers and
businesspeople have established, for any given commercial item, an optimal (or at
least a reasonable) price.
42 “Price-based  acquisition is a way . . .  to buy . .  . that does not re ly primarily
on a supplier providing cost da ta. . . . ‘[P]ure’ price-based acquisition is at one end
of a continuum.  At the other end is ‘pure’ cost-based  acquisition . . . where
virtually every aspec t of the [government-]supplier relationship demands that the
supplier provide [the government] with actual or estimated costs.” Defense
Contract Management Agency, Price Based Acquisition Report, available at
<http://www.dcma.mil/reference/pbareport.doc>.
43 In the U.S. procurement system, these are frequently dubbed “major
systems.”  See generally  48 C.F.R. § 34, referencing OMB Circular A-109.
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Accordingly, reform advocates frequently broaden the debate to suggest that
the government should, on a more global basis, move towards price-based
contracting42 (or away from cost-reimbursement contracting).  This theory assumes
that, if the government consistently tries to avoid cost-based contracts and buy
based  upon marke t prices (or s imply mandates price-based contrac ting to the
exclusion of cost-based contracting), the government will gravitate towards
commercial so lutions available in the marke tplace.  Further, if the government
relies upon contractor or market pricing, there is no need for contractors to disclose
propriety cost information to the government (which, historically, has been deemed
necessary to negotiate cost reimbursement work).
All of which is true, unless the government needs items and services for
which there is no commercial market, such as where the government requires
development of hugely expensive and sophisticated military-unique items.43 
Contrac tors that agree to perform developmenta l work for fixed prices assume
high, and in many cases unreasonable, degrees of risk.  Historically, cost
reimbursement contrac ts insulated those contractors from assuming unreasonable
44 See generally 48 C.F.R. § 12.601.
45 GSA, White Paper, supra note 35.
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risks, but that insulation comes a t a price.  The price, a t a minimum, is that the
government buyer obtains access to much of the company’s proprietary cost
information.  Once the government begins reques ting proprietary cost or pricing
data, most agree tha t the transac tion is  no longer perceived as commercial.
This long-winded scenario bears out this author’s perception, discussed
further below, that commercial purchasing policies suit the government best when
applied in moderation.  Commercial purchas ing makes sense in low-dollar, high-
volume, lower complexity procurements .  As individual procurements  expand in
size, grow in complexity, and assume greater significance, it becomes more
rational to fall back upon procurement policies intended to insulate government
agencies, end users, and taxpayers from undue risk. 
2.3.2. Other Commercial Vehicles
In developing a commercial item purchasing regime, the government has
become increasingly reliant on commercial contractua l vehicles.  The various
vehicles reflect the drafters’ intent to simplify the solicitation and evaluation
procedures.44  The acquisition reform movement created numerous options for
contrac ting officers to sat isfy their requirements and provided contracting offic ials
with greater discretion to determine how best to achieve their goals.45  Numerous
46 See, e.g.,  48 C.F.R. § 12.601 (“These procedures are  intended to s implify the
process of preparing and issuing solicitations, and evaluating offers for commercial
items consistent with customary commercial practices.”); 48 C.F.R. § 12.602 (b)
(“For many commercial items, the [evaluation] criteria need not be more detailed
than technical (capability of the item offered to meet the agency need), price and
past performance”).
47 See GSA, W hite Paper, supra note 35 (“ The underlying philosophy . . . is the
realization that expending considerable effort for a competition under $2,500
would not generate sufficient savings to  justify the expense . As such, . . . if the
price is cons idered reasonable,  [micro-purchases] may be  awarded without
soliciting competitive quotations. . . .”)
48 48 C.F.R. § 13.001 explains that the “‘Government-wide commercial
purchase  card’ .  . . [is] similar in nature to a commercial credit ca rd, issued to
authorized agency personnel to use to  acquire and  to pay for supplies and
services.” See also generally, 48 C.F.R. § 13.301.  (“Purchase cards let agencies
streamline the buying process, use online catalogs, improve the payment process
and make payments electronically.”) Statement of Frank P. Pugliese Jr.,
commissioner of GSA’s Federal Supply Service, available at
<http://www.gcn.com/vol19_no19/news/2400-1.html>.  For an extensive
examination of the proliferation of purchase card activity, see Neil S. Whiteman,
Charging Ahead: Has the G overnment Purchase Card Exceeded Its  Limit?  30 PUB.
CONT. L.J 403 (2001); Steven L. Schooner & N eil Whiteman, Purchase Cards and
Micro-Purchases: Sacrificing Traditional United States Procurement Policies At
the Altar of  Efficiency 9 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV.148 (2000).
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“streamlined solicitation procedures” sprang up, promising to reduce  the time
required to acquire commercial items.46
This author be lieves that the single mos t successful effort to make the
government more commercial is found in the low-visibility arena of high-volume,
low-dollar purchasing.  In this arena, two innovations – creation of the micro-
purchase threshold47 and the use of purchase cards48 – have dramatically altered the
way in which the government does business.  Further, these developments appear
49 Although the Government long had used plastic purchase or charge cards for
employee travel and fleet use (e .g., gasoline purchases ), it did not permit charge
card use  for the general procurement function.  Ins tead, for small purchases , the
Government primarily relied upon purchase orders or its equivalent o f petty cash,
known as the imprest fund.   The imprest fund is a  “cash fund of a fixed amount
established by an advance of funds, without charge to an appropriation, from an
agency finance o r disbursing officer to a duly appointed cashier, for disbursement
as needed from time to time in making payment in cash for rela tively small
amounts.”  48 C.F.R. § 13.001.
50 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 explains that a micro-purchase is an acquisition of supplies
or services w hich does  not exceed $2,500,  except for construction,  where the limit
is $2,000.  See generally  41 U.S.C. § 428; 48 C.F.R . §§ 13.201, 13.202; Pub. L.
No. 103-355, § 1054 (October 13, 1994).
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truly commercial, in that the government’s behavior mimics that of common
consumers and businesses.
Although the government only began widespread use of conventional charge
cards for purchasing in the last decade,  the practice  spread  quickly.49  The real
catalyst credited with accelerating government purchase  card usage was  the
legislatively created micro-purchase authority below the threshold of $2,500.50 
Below tha t threshold, buyers may ignore the  government’s  normal procurement
rules and procedures  (which mandate transparency and competition).  Quite
simply, government buyers, armed with a purchase card, can purchase what they
want, from whomever they p lease, however they prefer (in person, over the
telephone, via the Internet, etcetera), so long as individual purchases do not exceed
$2,500.
Crit ics fear that this flexible procedure, without d iligent oversight, is
susceptible to abuse . For example, buying offices recognize the benefits – in terms
51 Although there is only limited insight into how the purchase cards are used,
isolated problems have surfaced.  See generally  Glenda Cooper, Education Dept.
Credit Cards Seized in Anti-Fraud Effort, WASHINGTON POST, July 18, 2001, at  
A27.
52 See generally  The Competition in Contract Act of 1984 (CICA), Pub. L. No.
98-369, D iv. B., Title VII, 98 Stat. 1175 (July 18, 1984).
53 This entails more than 23 million transactions per year. See Federal
Procurement Data System, Federal Procurement Report (2000), p. 13, available at
<http://fpds.gsa.gov/Fpds/FPR2000a.pdf>.  The FPDS provides statistical data -- at
the time of contract award or inception -- about Federal Executive Branch
procurement contract transactions.  Contrasted with the extensive information
provided for most procurements, the FPDS provides only summary data on
purchase card transactions – no more than the number of transactions and dollars
spent by individual agencies.  See generally  41 U.S.C. §§ 405(d)(4)(A), 417,
mandating the es tablishment of an automated sys tem for collecting, evaluating, and
disseminating information about Federal procurement contracts. See also FPDS
(last visited August 1, 2000) <http://fpds.gsa.gov/fpds/fpds.htm>.  It appears that
the Defense Department is moving in the direction of at least attempting to remedy
this situation.  See generally  65 Fed. Reg. 39707 (June 27, 2000), amending, inter
alia, 48 C.F.R. §  204.670-1, including, for the first time, “ [p]urchases made us ing
the Governmentwide commercial purchase card” in the definition of “contracting
action.”
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of their time and effort -- of (improperly) splitting their larger requirements into
smaller units to stay below micro-purchase threshold. 51  In Fiscal Year 2000, more
than 670,000 government employees spent in excess of five percent of all Federal
procurement dollars (more than $12 billion) without: risk of pro test or third-party
monitoring; full and open competition typically mandated for the government’s
business; 52 use of standard solicitation provisions and contract clauses that insulate
the government from frequently acknow ledged risks ; or visibility in the Federal
Procurement Data System (FPDS).53
54 See GSA, White Paper, supra note 35 (“Simplified acquisition procedures
(SAP) recognize that the time and expense of conducting a full and open
competition is  not w arranted  for acquisitions under the SAP threshold (generally
$100,000). As such, SAP encourages the use of severa l techniques including;
Credit card purchases; Purchase Orders; electronic purchasing; Blanket Purchase
Agreements (BPAs)… (1) permit innovative approaches (2) emphasize the use of
FACNET and other e lectronic  purchasing techniques (3) permit  oral solic itation in
certain circumstances (3) allow the use of a combined synopsis/solicitation (4)
have eliminated many full and open clauses and provisions (5) Simplified
acquisitions are  set aside  for small business (if over $2,500), publicized, and
competed to the "maximum extent practicab le.")
55 See generally  Pub. L. No.  103-355 §§ 4001, 4201, e t seq.; 48 C .F.R. Subpart
13.3. “‘Simplified acquisition threshold’ means $100,000, except that in the case of
any contrac t to be aw arded and performed, or purchase to be  made, outside the
United States in support of a contingency operation . . . or a humanitarian or
peacekeeping operation . . . , the term means $200,000.” 48 C.F.R. § 2.101
(citations omitted). Simplified acquisition procedures are intended to: “(a) Reduce
administrative cos ts; (b) Improve  opportunities for small, small disadvantaged, and
women-owned small business concerns to obtain a fair proportion of Government
contrac ts; (c) Promote efficiency and economy in contrac ting; and (d) Avoid
unnecessary burdens for agencies and contractors.” 48 C.F.R. § 13.002.
56 Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP), at <http://www.acq-
ref.navy.mil/turbo2/topics/be.cfm>. 
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Once purchases become large enough to exceed the micro-purchase
threshold, government buyers proceed to the streamlined simplified acquisition
procedures  (SAP).54  Simplified acquisition procedures55 are “designed to reduce
the administrative burden of awarding the lower dollar value procurements. They
allow informal quoting and competition procedures, encourage accepting oral
quotes vice  written quota tions, prefer comparing quoted prices vice  conducting
negotiations, and provide streamlined clauses to support the award document.”  56 
These purchases – above the micro-purchase threshold, but below the separate
simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 – are  not free from all government
57 GSA, White Paper, supra note 35.
58 48 C.F.R. §§ 13.104, 13.106-1(b), (c).  It appears that even minimal
competitive market research –  in this case requesting quote from three sources – is
not required. See Cybertech G roup, Inc. v. United Sta tes, 48 Fed. Cl. 638 (2001).
59 For o ther purchases,  the G overnment publicizes its pending requirements  in
print and on the Internet through the Commerce Business Daily (CBD). See
generally 48 C.F.R. § 5 .101(a)(1); availab le at <http://cbdnet.gpo.gov>.
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procurement rules and procedures . Yet they offer substantial insulation from the
normal time-consuming competition- and transparency-related requirements. 
Accordingly, these streamlined procedures also increase efficiency at the expense
of public notice and , as a result, competition and oversight.
The defining charac teristics of many of these actions is tha t the contrac ting
officer: (1) need only “promote competition to the maximum extent practicable” as
opposed to seeking full and open competition;57 (2) can limit the competition to as
few as three vendors  “within the loca l trade area”; (3) may “solicit quotations
orally to the maximum extent practicable”; and (4) in ce rtain circumstances,  solic it
from a single source.58  Contrasted with the  government’s  typical po licy of broadly
advertising its procurements,59 fewer firms are aware  of (or realize they missed the
opportunity to compete for) the  large number of Federal purchases under the
$100,000 simplified acquisition threshold.  Procurement officials claim that the
federal government benefits from these contracts because they reduce contract
award  times, administrative costs, prices, and delivery times for products and
services.  The government has considered raising the $100,000 threshold to $5
60 See 48 C.F.R. § 13.5, raising the threshold to $5 million for a limited test
period due to expire on January 1, 2002.  Critics cite the SAP exemption from
advertising in Commerce Business Daily as a possible reason for this failure. See
generally GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPT. NO. GAO-01-517, Contract Managem ent:
Benefits of Simplified Acquisition Test Procedures Not Clearly Demonstrated
(April 20, 2001), available at <http://www.gao.gov>.
61 See GSA, White Paper, supra note 35 (“FSS contracts provide
program/project managers simplified ordering vehicles to acquire commercial
products and services: (1) nearly every commercial product and major service
provider is available under GSA schedule; (2) ordering authority can be delegated;
(3) considerable flexibility in the selection process; (4) Streamlined BPA’s for
repetitive purchases”); but see id. (“(1) the number of contractors with which
orders are placed can dilute product standardization. Unless a BPA is established,
each order must go through the FSS competitive process; (2) The FSS contracts set
standard contract terms and conditions…Agency loses some control; (3)FSS
contractor pas t performance information is generally not available”).
62 “GSA Advantage! is a valuable shopping resource  that anyone can use to
find and research products, services and vendors.  However, to make purchases on
the system,  you must be a  Federal Government employee buying on behalf of your
agency.”  See generally <http://www.gsaadvantage.gov>.
63 GSA, White Paper, supra note 35.
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million, yet recent reports have shown that the utilization of simplified acquisition
procedures does not always result in a fair and reasonable price.60
The General Service Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS)
Contracts simplify an agency’s ability to acquire commercial items.61  The program
permits program managers access to  existing contracts with over 6,000 vendors
offering millions of products.  Consistent with the proliferation of government-
sponsored electronic catalogues, the GSA – the closest the U.S. gets to a
centralized purchasing agency – facilitates on-line purchasing through GSA
Advantage!62  Because they are flexible, the  supply schedules are especially useful
for repetitive purchases.63  “This program, which is implemented in FAR part 8,
64 Linda S. Lebowitz, “Bid Protest Issues Arising in Commercial Item
Acquisition.” (Winter, 1998) 27 PUB. CONT. L.J 429, 449.
65 GSA, White Paper, supra note 35.
66 See GSA, White Paper, supra note  35 (“A BPA for products  is particularly
useful where the agency wants to standardize on a set of products for
interoperability and integration.  Instead of conducting a competition for each
purchase, the agency can conduct a one-time BPA competition”)
67 See GSA, White Paper, supra note 35.
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provides federal agencies with a simplified process for obtaining commonly used
supplies and services at prices associated with volume buying.”64  Although the
FSS offers significant time savings, it has significant limitations.  For example,
each order must go through a competitive process and contractor past performance
information is genera lly not available  to buyers. Further, agenc ies cede  a fair
amount of control to the GSA system, because contract terms and conditions are
set when the FSS contract is formed.65
Agencies frequently use “blanket purchase agreements” (BPA’s) when they
foresee a continuing need for products or services.”66  BPA’s  allow the agency to
“aggregate requirements and obtain quantity discounts from the vendors” because
once the BPA is awarded, further competition is not required.67  Government
buyers may use BPA’s to “negotiate lower prices and better delivery terms” instead
of awarding new contracts.  Additionally, because BPA’s under the FSS schedules
theoretically entail competitive procedures, “schedule users are no t required to
synopsize requirements, seek further competition, make a separate determination
68 Air Force, Navy Guidance  Curta il New Blanket Purchase  Agreements , 68
FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) No. 18, p. 8  (November 17, 1997).
69 See GSA, White Paper, supra note  35 (“A BPA for products  is particularly
useful where the agency wants to standardize on a set of products for
interoperability and integration.  Instead of conducting a competition for each
purchase, the agency can conduct a one-time BPA competition”)
70 48 C.F.R . § 16.501 explains: “There are  three types of indefinite-delivery
contracts: definite-quantity contracts, requirements contracts, and indefinite-
quantity contracts. The appropriate type of indefinite-delivery contract may be
used to acquire supplies and/or services when the exact times and/or exact
quantities of future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award. . . .
[R]equirements contracts and indefinite-quantity contracts are also known as
delivery order contracts or task order contracts.”
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of fair and reasonable pricing, or consider small business set-asides.”68  Blanket
purchase agreements are useful “where the agency wants to standardize on a set of
products for interoperability and integration.”69
Another type  of contractua l vehic le tha t merits examination is loose ly
referred to as the umbrella contract.  These vehicles facilitate the government’s
purchase of varying amounts of supplies or services during a fixed period (within
stated limits, usually expressed  in numbers of units or as  dollar values), w ith
deliveries or performance to be scheduled by placing orders directly with the
contractor.70 Indefinite-delivery contrac ts permit  the t ime of delivery to remain
unspecified in the original contract but later be  established  by the contracting
officer during performance.  An indefinite-quantity  contract p rovides for volume
fluctuations within stated maximum or minimum limits, of specific supplies or
services to  be furnished, w ith deliveries to be scheduled by placing orders  with the
71 48 C.F.R. § 16.504(a);  RALPH C. NASH, STEVEN L. SCHOONER & KAREN
O’BRIEN, 296 THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK (2d ed. 1998).
72 See generally  48 C.F.R. § 16.5.
73 48 C.F.R. § 16.504(c).  See GSA, White Paper, supra note 35 (“ In contrast to
GSA FSS contracts, the majority of [these contracts] are written for a particular
purpose and contain special terms and conditions for that activity…FASA
established  a statutory preference for [these contracts].  In most cases, maintaining
a competitive environment through multiple awards leads to decreased prices,
increased quality, better performance, and increased flexibility for the agency.)
74 J.A. Howell, Governmentwide Agency Contracts: Vehicle Overcrowding on
the Procurement Highway, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J, 395, 397 (1998).
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contractor.71  Collectively, the two are more commonly referred to as indefinite-
delivery/indefinite-quantity or ID/IQ contracts. 72
The government’s use of indefinite-quantity contracts is not new. What is novel
is the legislative preference for making multiple awards of indefinite-quantity
contrac ts.  In multiple award ID /IQ contrac ts, the government uses a  single
solic itation for the same or similar supplies or services but awards a contract  – in
effect an opportunity to compete – to two or more previously identified sources.73 
The most unique and popular of the new ID/IQ vehicles are the multiple award
contracts, which serve a single agency, and the Government Wide Acquisition
Contrac ts, or GWAC ’s, awarded and serviced  by one agency, but made available to
other agencies.74  Similar to the GSA FSS schedule contrac ts, these  ID/IQ contracts
are existing contract vehicles (or umbrella contracts) that offer program managers a
selection of products, services, and suppliers. This pool of contractors then
75 GSA, White Paper, supra note 35.
76 48 C.F.R . § 16.505(a)(7) explains that: “No protest under [FAR] Subpart
33.1 is authorized in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of an order
under a task order contract or delivery order contract except for a protest on the
grounds that the  order increases the scope,  period, or maximum value of the
contract.”
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competes for individual task or delivery orders under a streamlined  “fair
opportunity” process.
Proponents of GW AC’s  assert tha t because they maintain a competitive
environment throughout the life of the contract (at the task or delivery order level),
their utilization results in “decreased prices, increased quality, better performance,
and increased flexibility for the agency.”75  Because  Congress expected that there
would be robust competition under this regime, the legislative mandate bars
contractors from protes ting award decisions for individual task or delivery orders
(which effectively bars third-party contractor oversight).  The theory was that
protests  would be  superfluous in the anticipa ted hyper-competitive environment. 76 
Unfortunately, less than a decade ago, the goods and services ob tained through
these individual task or delivery orders represented hotly contested individual
procurements.  Today, part and parcel of the multiple award ID/IQ contract
phenomenon is the ability to by-pass time consuming “full and open competition,”
which, for more than fifteen years, has served as the defining standard for award of
most government contracts .  As a result, despite the fact that competition proved  to
77 In principle, up-front competition is conducted for the initial multiple-award
contrac t. Contractors were supposed to compete to become part of an umbrella
contract, which offers them little more than the opportunity to compete for
individual task or delivery orders.  Unfortunately, the anticipated competition
rarely materializes – agencies tend to include all comers on the contract vehicle. 
This makes sense, to the extent that inclusion on the contract is no more than an
opportunity to  compete, akin to  a “hunting license.”  Yet real competition also  is
absent in the task  order stage .  Because a ll “contract  holders” may market  their
services d irectly to individual agencies,  those agencies – affected by cons iderations
including speed , convenience, personal preference, and human na ture – frequently
obtain those services on a sole source or non-competitive basis from those
possessing these hunting licenses.   As a  result, legitimate competition infrequently
occurs.  See generally  GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPT. NO. GAO/NSIAD-00-56 at 4,
Contract Management: Few Competing Proposals for Large DOD Information
Technology Orders (March 20, 2000).  As a result, this popular, time-saving
purchasing methodology proliferates  despite its failure to comply with
Congressional intent. Professor John Cibinic described the current situation as
“virtual anarchy.” John Cibinic, Jr., Task and Delivery Order Contracting:
Congress Speaks, GAO Reports, and the FAR Does a Fan Dance, 14 NASH &
CIBINIC REP. ¶ 32  (June  2000) (“ It is obvious that C ongress smells something
fishy but doesn’t quite know w hat to do about it.”).
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be chimerical, 77 these contract vehicles insulate  an ever increasing piece of the
procurement pie from meaningful competition.  Equally significant, these vehicles
deny the government, contractors, and the  public third-party oversight of this
spending.
The rapid evolution of electronic commerce also serves as a useful study
because the private sector, rather than the government, led the transition from
paper-based procurement to e-commerce.  As many Internet shoppers now
recognize, e-commerce offers a cheap, accessible, and ubiquitous method of
obtaining comparative and competitive information on product quality,
78 Professor David Darcy, E-Government Best Practices: An Implementation
Manual, available at United States General Services Administration
<http://egov.gov/library.htm>.
79 Letter from the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, to the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (July 1, 1997) available at
<http://egov.gov/documents/ecpress.htm>.
80 L. Gordon-Murnan, Business-to-Government E-Commerce Procurement:
Business Models, E-Mails, and Special Groups, (July 23, 2001), available at
<http://special.northernlight.com/ecommerce/procurement.htm> (citing The
Federal Electronic Acquisition Team final report, Streamlining Procurement
through Electronic Commerce (1994).)
81 See, e.g.,  Defense D epartment’s  E-M all at <http://www.emall.dla.mil/>, and
the Small Business M all at <http://www.smallbizmall.gov/>. 
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availability, and price.78  Governments play an important role in e-commerce,
because, in its leadership role, it can either facilitate or inhibit electronic trade.
“Government officials must respect the unique nature of the medium and recognize
that widespread consumer choice and increased competition should be  the defining
features of the new digital marketplace.”79 Fortunately, the government has
embraced the power of e-commerce in order “to enhance . . . customer
relationships, achieve leverage  in the marketplace, reduce costs  and the need to
retain large inventories, and obtain faster and more reliable deliveries of material
and services.”80
Government agencies have developed various resources  in order to implement
e-commerce into their procurement regimes.  For example, agencies have
developed catalogue systems accessible through the World Wide Web.81 
Electronic catalogues offer several advantages. They enable agencies to exhaust
fewer resources to  make repetitive purchases, allow agencies to leverage buying
82 Memorandum from Steven Kelman from the Office of Federal Procurement
policy to the Agency Senior Procurement Executives and the acting Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense. (March 14, 1997) available at
<http://www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/PolicyDocs/eccat327.html>.  Catalog
systems involve: “a contrac t with pre-es tablished bus iness arrangements with
industry; a means for the customer to identify and order goods and services, either
from within an agency (intra-agency) or by more than one agency (inter-agency);
and  sufficient information (updated to reflect changes) for the cus tomer to
compare the items offered by performance, price and delivery.”
83 See generally Buyers.Gov – Reverse Auctions at
<http://www.buyers.gov/private_home.html>. 
84 Colleen O’Hara, GSA Moves Ahead with Reverse Auctions, (June 1, 2001) at
<http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2001/0604/web-buyer-06-06-01.asp>.
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buyer through “volume purchas ing” and permit agencies to make “spot”
purchases.82 Conversely, the rapid, almost frenetic proliferation of these e-
catalogues leads to government purchaser confusion.  Also,  in its increasingly
balkanised configuration, e-catalogue shopping denies the  government valuable
opportunities to  leverage its buying power to ga in favorable pricing through
volume purchas ing.
Active buying agencies have jumped onto the bandwagon of exciting new
electronic commerce techniques, such as utilizing “reverse auctions” to make
commercial purchases.83 Reverse auctions permit buyers to specify what they want
to buy and suggest a price  they are willing to pay; sellers then compete in an on-
line auction hall to offer the best price for the product.”84  Although certa in
problems remain with this new technology (such as formalizing the end of bidd ing
and flexibility to entertain additional offers in “overtime”), proponents of reverse
85 See generally, W. Kelley, Electronic Posting System/ Federal Business
Opportunities  System  Manual (August 24, 2000) at
<http://www 2.eps .gov/EPSBuyersM anual/coversheet.htm>  (“The
EPS/FedBizOpps System provides the functionality to forward synopses for
agency requirements to the Commerce Business Daily (CBD).  The system also
provides the functionality for vendors to obtain access to agency business
opportunities and to register to receive email notification of these requirements.”)  
86 See generally <http://www.eps.gov/>.
87 See United States General Services Administration, FedBizOpps Designated
as Governmentwide Point of Entry for Procurement Opportunities, at
<http://www.eps.gov/PR-9825FedBizOpps.html> (last visited May 18 , 2001).
35
auctions  point to substantial savings achieved through the utilization of this
procurement method.
Consistent with the e-commerce expansion, the government recently introduced
FedBizOpps,85 its fledgling “single point of entry” for procurement opportunities.86 
Intended as an electronic procurement clearinghouse,  agencies use FedBizO pps to
post relevant procurement information on the Internet (including procurement
notices,  solic itations, drawings, and amendments) and eventually rece ive electronic
proposals.  As this technology becomes more widely used, commercial vendors
can react more quickly to procurement opportunities because they are better
informed.87
2.4. Reliance on the  Private Sector  to Perform Commercial Functions
As suggested earlier, the government’s effort to act more like a business has
coincided with a renewed interest in, and in so doing injected immediacy into,
privatization and contracting out.  Because  the process of outsourcing existing
88 In response to these  perceived needs, the Bush adminis trat ion recently
ordered  over 40,000 federal workers to compete for their jobs  with the private
sector.   Ellen Nakashima, Bush O pens 40,000 Federa l Workers’ Jobs to
Competition, THE WASHINGTON POST, Friday, June 8 , 2001, at A27.  The naïve
quest for a “smaller” government masks the more important policy question of
whether a  large shadow government (or contrac tor corps) is preferable to  the
perceived  entrenched  and bloated civil service). “The public does not want a
government that works  better and costs less, but one that looks smaller and delivers
more.” Consequently, the government has responded by outsourcing jobs outward
to a shadow workforce. Paul C. Light, The Public Service (June 1, 1999) availab le
at <http://GovExec.com>.  Light suggests that the shadow government, which
resided mostly outside the public's consciousness, reflects decades of personnel
ceilings, hiring limits, and unrelenting pressure to do more with less.
89  See also Statement of Thomas G. McInerney Lieutenant General, USAF
(Ret.), Former President and CEO, BENS before the National Defense  Panel of the
Quadrennial Defense Review pursuant to the Military Force Structure Review Act
Of 1996 availab le at < http://www.bens.org/other_0497.html> (“Outsourcing and
privatization can do for defense what it did for America’s leading edge businesses
– free up resources to  concentra te on core  competencies… the Federa l Government
must accept “that w hen it comes to  running commercial-type operations,  the
private sector has built a better mousetrap.”).
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government functions reflects the government’s willingness to increase its reliance
on the private sector to perform its commerc ial functions, it provides a  useful
microcosm for examination here. There is a wide-spread perception that
outsourcing reduces the s ize of the Federal government and  permits the
government to provide necessary se rvices with less  burden on the  taxpaying
public.88  Further, proponents assert that outsourcing will lead agencies to conduct
themselves in a more “businesslike manner,” increasing flexibility and taxpayer
savings.89
90 In the process of governing, the  Government should not compete with its
citizens. The competitive enterprise system, characterized by individual freedom
and initiative, is the primary source of national economic strength. In recognition
of this principle, it has been and continues to be the  general policy of the
Government to rely on commercial sources  to supply the products and services  the
Government needs.  See OMB Circular A-76. 
91 A commercial source is a  business or other non-Federal activity located in
the United S tates, its territories and possess ions, the District of Columbia or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which provides a commercial product or service. 
See OMB Circular A-76.
92 By definition, “inherently Governmental functions,” cannot be obtained from
a commercial source.  Inherently Governmental functions are so intimately related
to the public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees. These
functions require either the  exercise o f discretion in applying Government
authority or the use  of value judgment in making decisions for the Government.
Inherently Governmental functions normally fall into two categories: the act of
governing (or the discretionary exercise of Government authority) or  monetary
transactions and entitlements, such as tax collection  or control of the money
supply.  See OMB A-76.  But see Statement of Max Sawicky, Economic Policy
Institute, Commercial Activities Panel (Public Hearing, Washington, D.C. June 11,
2001) (“ The OM B Circula r’s  way of defining services tha t are  ‘inherently
governmental’ is seriously flawed. . . .  ”);  Statement of John Sweeney, National
President,  AFL-CIO, Commercial Activities Panel (Public Hearing, Washington,
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The U.S. Government’s policy is to rely on the commercial sector90 or, more
specifically, commercially available sources,91 to provide commercial products and
services.  OM B Circular A-76 directs that “the Government shall not start or carry
on any activity to provide a commercial product or service if the product or service
can be procured more economically from a commercial source.”
This basic policy implies that all commercial activities should, or at the very
least might, be contracted out to private concerns.  The government defines
commercial activities as functions operated by a Federal executive agency that
provide a product or service that can be obtained from a commercial source.92  The
D.C. June 11, 2001) (“The government should broadly define the concept of
“inherently governmental” functions.  Not only should the government err on the
side  of caution in determining that a particula r service  is not inherently
governmental, but should also be careful about the extent to which even
commercial services are outsourced.”).
93 The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR), Public Law No.105-
270, 112  Stat. 2382 (1998).
94 See generally  James H. Ward, John C . Deal & Drew  Hamilton Outsourcing
Pits Mission vs. Money (April 1, 2001 ), available at
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policy appears simple: if a private source can provide the product or se rvice, the
government should not be in the business of competing with that private source. 
To facilitate this policy, the government recently mandated that all agencies
publicly disclose an inventory of all (non-inherently governmental) commercial
activities performed by federal employees.93
The primary exception to this  policy, however,  is an economic  one, and it is
manifested through the threshold mechanism for determining whether a
commercial ac tivity should be outsourced – the  cost comparison.  The government
may keep performance of a commercial activity in-house if a cost comparison
demonstra tes that the government either is operating or can  opera te the activity at
an estimated lower cost than a qualified commercial source.  These small caveats –
“operating or can operate” and “es timated lower cost” –  permit the government to
structure (or construct or, arguably, imagine) a most efficient organization (MEO)
of the in-house government work force, and then compare this MEO with qualified
commercial providers.  Not surprisingly, this makes the cos t comparison a
controversial, frequently litigated linchpin of the contracting out process.94 
<http://www.govexec.com/features/0401/0401viewpoint.htm>.
95 Strong opposition comes from policymakers and labor unions that doubt that
privatization and outsourcing actually saves the government money or make
procurement more efficient.  For example, popular author Robert Kuttner has
pointed out several of the d isadvantages of p rivatization: accountability,  for-profit
thriving at the expense of the  nonprofit,  hidden costs, and a possible  decrease in
the continuity and quality of service. See The Disadvantages of Privatization Not
Readily Apparent, Author Says, 75 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) NO.3, p. 66 (January
16, 2001). 
96 Opponents also a rgue that, because the  private industry is not subject to the
same rules that constrain public officials, accountability problems will arise.  See
Ellen Nakashima, Bush Opens 40,000 Federal Workers’ Jobs to Competition, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Friday, June 8, 2001, at A27.
97  For example,  government documents frequently suggest that “ there is no
assumption that the private sector will win the competition. This process has been
referred to as ‘outsourcing’ or ‘contracting-out’, but only ‘competitive sourcing’
accurately describes and refers to the A-76 process.”  See Share A-76! Glossary
(defining “competitive sourcing” at <http://emissary.acq.osd.mil/inst/share.nsf>).
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Problems arise because the contracting out of existing governmental
functions typically means: (1) d isplacing government employees  (or c ivil
servants)95 and (2) diffusing the management power of high-level government
officials,96 both of which frequently lead to intense  institutional resistance to
contracting out. 97  Accord ingly, the private sector lacks confidence that the
government fair ly and  accurately represents its  true cos ts of performance.  This
cynicism is fuelled by the private sector’s perception that the government does not
include in its pricing the element of risk.  If the government underestimates the  true
costs o f its performance –  a low-risk proposition in the absence of a profit motive
or shareholders – the government is more likely to retain the work in-house. 
Underestimation of costs by private firms could lead to financial disaster.  Yet
98   Although there are  any number of efforts to  distinguish the government
from a commercial buyer, at least four differences imply that the government may
never fully embrace commercial practices: (1) the government and commercial
buyers have different responsibilities; (2) the government’s funding rules –
particularly the annual budget cycle that results in successive one-year contracts –
limit the government’s ability to properly consider affordability, cost of money, or
financing; (3) the effect of social and economic programs; and (4) the impact of
monopsony, particularly with regard to military-unique items.  See generally 
James C. Roan, Jr., Streamlining Government Acquisition (Or, ‘Why Can’t the
Government Figure Out H ow to Use Commercia l Practices?’), ARMY LAW. 58
(May 1995).  
99   Conversely, this does  not suggest tha t there are no t systemic limits that have
slowed the government’s efforts to become more  commercial.  For example, the
government’s  failure to invest in training in existing workforce has been penny-
wise and pound-foolish.  This failure has been exacerbated by seemingly random
reductions in acquisition personnel leaving a graying, overburdened, and (all too
frequently) dispirited procurement workforce.
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there are few , if any, analogous risks for government employees if subsequent
performance experience demonstrates that government performance indeed proved
more costly than the government’s estimate.
3. Impediments To a Truly Commercial Federal Procurement Regime
Numerous  aspec ts of the Federal procurement regime inhibit the
government’s ability to adopt truly commercial practices.  To some extent, these
impediments highlight the differences between government norms and the mores
of the commercial marketplace.98  Some of these distinguishing issues reflect the
nature of the U.S. political landscape, and many are larger than the fundamental
buying practices  that one would expec t to constitute procurement policy.99
Historically, the government has behaved differently from private enterprise,
and the courts reinforced the  distinction between private and government
100 See Krygoski Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1537 (Fed.
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1691 (1997) (upholding termination for
convenience). But see United States v. Winstar Corp. et al., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
(limiting the government’s rights and duties to those  generally applicab le to
contracts between private individuals).
101 Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and
Exceptionalism in Government Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633
(1996).
102 The nature of the Government’s buying practices prevents it from
functioning similarly to the private sector. See generally  Steven L. Schooner,
Impossibility of Performance in  Public Contrac ts: An Economic Analysis, (1986)
16 PUB. CONT. L.J 229, 262-63.
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contracts.100  This distinction exposes a fundamental tension that underlies the
ongoing evolution of federal government contract law, policy, and case law. 
Compelling arguments favor both the distinctions and the similarities between
government and private purchasing.  As my colleague, Joshua Schwartz observes,
the U.S. embraces both the traditions of “exceptiona lism” and “congruence.” The
exceptionalist view of government contracting emphasizes the unique status,
attributes, and needs of the federal government.  The congruent view seeks  to
assimilate the government's contractual rights and duties to  those of private
entities.101  The effort to buy more commercial items and incorporate commercial
practices  signals a resurgence of congruent-type policy making.  Yet the
exceptionalist constraints, which impede the implementation of a truly commercial
government purchasing regime, cannot be ignored.102
103 See generally Kathryn Dean Checchi, Federal Procurement and
Commercial Procurement under the U.C.C.—A Comparison, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J
358 (1980)  (comparing the formation, modification, inspection/rejection rights,
remedies, and warranties of government contracts and commercial contracts).  
104 See Michael K. Love, Public v. Private Procurement: Your Tax Dollars at
Work (American Bar Association Section of Public Contract Law 1997 Annual
Meeting Program) (claiming that the government practices can never mirror private
practices because taxpayers want more than just best value for their money—they
want social policies too; contracting officials must satisfy the “inconsistent needs
of a variety of stakeholders”  while private officials “satisfy corpora te management
[goals of profit maximization]first”); see also Marshall J. Doke, Competition
requirements in public contracting: the myth of full and open competition, 64 FED.
CONT. REP., (BNA) No. 3, special supplement (July 17, 1995) (“Most commercial
purchaser buy on a sole source basis, buy more than they need, can afford to accept
gifts, entertainment, and kickbacks”).
105 A sampling of 50 of the largest U.S. industrial and service companies
showed that total average executive compensation reached $10.9 million in 2000.
The bulk of pay came through s tock options, with eleven corpora te chiefs rece iving
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Of the many differences between government contracts and commercial
contracts,103  the greates t conceptual differences likely arise because the
government is not driven by a profit motive.104  In the absence of a profit motive
(or the fear of incurring a loss), the government – both as an organization and a
collection of individuals – lacks the engine that spurs the competitive marketplace. 
In this regard, there is stark contrast be tween the  private and public sectors  in the
U.S.  For example, in the private sector, executive compensation typica lly is
structured to at trac t top  talent and reward those  who contribute to  profit
maximization (or shareholder return), frequently through stock incentive programs. 
In the public sector, civil service pay, based upon position and time in grade (rather
than performance) frequently is criticized as inadequate; bonuses, when available,
are insignificant.105
grant values in excess of $50  million. CEOs at these firms rece ived an average
stock option package of $6.5 million in 2000. See Shannon Jones, US executive
compensation rose 16 percent in 2000, available at
<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/feb2001/exec-f28.shtml>.  Only recently was
the salary of the President of the U nited States , the most highly paid c ivil servant,
increased from $200,000 to $400,000.  3 U.S.C. § 102.
106 The author does not believe that wealth distribution is one of the U.S.
procurement system’s primary goals.  This does not suggest that the legislature
does not use the procurement system to attempt to redistribute wealth.  But those
efforts are trans itory for the same reasons they are controversial.  Moreover,  wealth
distribution is merely a subset of the larger phenomenon of burdening the
procurement process (or, for that matter, the process of governing) with efforts to
promote social policies.  These social policies potentially distribute wealth to
domestic manufac turers, essentia l military suppliers, and small (and small
disadvantaged and women-owned) businesses, while others mandate drug-free
workplaces, occupational safety standards, compliance with labor laws,
preferences for environmentally friendly purchasing practices, etcetera. 
Accord ingly, while the author concedes  that legislative manipulation of the
procurement process is a significant aspect or feature of the system, the author
cannot agree that wealth distribution is a fundamenta l purpose of the procurement
regime.
107 See Love, supra note 104  (arguing that competition is inconsistent with
private procurement prac tices); see also Weaver, supra note 107  (“in spending
taxpayer money, the government is obligated to act on a fair, open and equal basis
(picking favorites and making custom deals could frustrate the government goal of
promoting integrity)” unlike private companies w ho are not obligated to have
competition.   
108 See generally  Sue Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on
Transparency in Government Procurement, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 793, 796
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Further, because government purchases entail distribution of revenues
collected through taxation, the government often treats the procurement system as
a wealth distribution tool. 106  The government long has maintained tha t all qualified
citizens should be made aware of, and have a fair chance to compete for,
government contracts.107  The comparative  public  procurement community would
describe  this as a commitment to transparency.108 In practice,  this means that,
(1988).
109 See Love, supra note 104 (citing various government unique clauses
including: rules for source selection, fairness requirements, negotiation procedures,
agent authority, accounting and record keeping requirements, criminal penalties,
public interest, political consequences, and national welfare impacts); see also F.
Trowbridge vom Baur, Differences Between Commercial Contracts and
Government Contracts , 53 A.B.A. J. 247 (March, 1967) (maintaining that the
government always dea ls with contrac tors at an a rm’s length (i.e.; limited authority
of contracting officials, irrevocability of bids, limited negotiations, changes clause
v. commercial “pre-existing legal duty rule”).
110 For example, the Christian doctrine allows the government to obtain a
benefit of a unique clause if it fails to include it in the contract (because they are
read into the contract as a matter of law). See G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United
States, 312 F.2d 418  (Ct. Cl.), certiorari denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963).
111 vom Baur, supra note 109, at 248.
112 Responsiveness is an objective,  non-discretionary determination that a bid
conforms to the invitations for bids.  10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(3); 41 U .S.C.  §
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despite commerc ial item reformations, government contrac ts continue to  reta in
various prac tices, solicitation provisions, and contract c lauses incons istent with
conventional commercial contracts.109  Specifically, significant portions of a
government contract are never truly subject to negotiation because certain contract
terms and conditions are legislatively mandated.110 
At first glance, the absence of “real negotiations” appears to be a practice
difference, rather than an irreconc ilable foundational issue.   Many government
solicitations (sea led bid procurements, which might be analogized  to tendering)
prohibit true negotiations by requiring “absolute responsiveness to invitations for
bids.”111  When responding to an invitation for bids, a government contractor must
strictly abide by the form prescribed by the government.  Any deviation from these
requirements could result in a bid being declared non-responsive,112 “even though
253(b)(c); 48 C.F.R. §§ 14.301, 14.404-2.
113 Checchi, supra note 103, at 362.
114 See U.C.C . § 2-205 (firm-offers).
115 UCC § 2-206(1)(a).
116 UCC § 2-207.  The official comments explain that: “Under this Article a
proposed deal w hich in commerc ial understanding has in fact been closed is
recognized as a contract.”
117 vom Baur, supra note 109, at 248.
118 See J. C. Weaver, Government v. Private Purchasing,  American Bar
Association Section of Public Contract Law “Procurement Reform: A Never
Ending Cycle?” (Sunday, August 3 , 1997).
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the b idder’s deviation was accidental and the bidder is willing to correct his
mistake.”113  Additionally, once bids have been opened, the government contractor
cannot withdraw his or her bid. Unlike this firm-bid rule, commercial contracts  are
generally revocable up until the time  of accep tance unless the parties explicit ly
agree that the offer will be irrevocable.114
By analogy, the  UCC ’s contract formation standards are  much less stringent
than those required by the FAR.  For example, under the UCC, a party may accept
an offer “in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.”115 
Further, provided certain requirements are fulfilled, the UCC recognizes the
formation of a contract even if the offeree’s acceptance contains different or
additional terms.116
Further, while other government so licitations (what we refer to as  “requests
for proposals”) permit negotiations, the bartering remains limited.117  Certain
obligations are no t subject to  negotiation.118 Conversely, negotiations are a
119 This author has  asserted that these  three policies have, in the past and
should, in the future, continue to serve as the foundation for the  U.S. p rocurement
system. Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of
Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627 (2001).
120 See generally  John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the ‘Battle of the Forms’:
Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1986); D ouglas G.  Baird & R obert W eisberg,
Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of Section 2-207,
68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982).
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fundamental aspect of commercial contracts.  In the commercial marketplace, a
contract replete with non-negotiable, pre-drafted terms in which one party (for
example, the  government) enjoys substantia lly greater bargaining power is
generally not enforceable in the commercial contracting arena.   
Yet the question remains w hether the differences betw een government and
commercial practice can be reconciled.  Many of these differences derive from
significant governmental policies and cannot easily be jettisoned simply to
promote commercial behavior.  For example, the firm-bid rule, referenced above,
promotes important government policies, inter alia , transparency, integrity and
competition.119  Commercial firms, unconcerned  with transparency, scoff a t public
disclosure of bids and are not persuaded that rejecting other-than-“responsive”
offers maintains a level playing field.
Another difference is the abundance of boilerplate terms or standard contract
clauses.   Although boilerplate is no t uncommon in commercial contracting, the
government does not engage in the “battle of the forms,”120 because only the
government’s  standard  clauses a re used.  Unlike commercial boilerplate terms , the
121 vom Baur, supra note 109, at 248.
122 vom Baur, supra note 109, at 249, (citing G.L. Christian and Associates v.
United States, 312 F. 2d 418  (1963)).  
123 The drafters of this uniform commercial legislation continue to experience
many difficulties in adopting revisions to the code.  See generally  Neil B. Cohen,
Taking  Democracy Seriously, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 674 (March, 2001). 
124The specialized courts  and administrative boards tha t resolve government
contract d isputes remain cognizant of the UCC, but typically find that the
government’s purchasing regime is not bound by the UCC’s d ictates.  See
generally GAF Corp. v. United States, 932 F.2d 947 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that
the UCC is not binding in federal government contrac ts).
125 Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewllyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 554  (Summer, 2000).
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government’s  standard  provisions and  clauses cannot be ignored. The
government’s arsenal of standard clauses is not intended to be unfair to contractors,
provided contractors  learn what the  clauses mean.121  Inexperienced government
contractors find themselves in se rious trouble or w aive valuable, valid claims
simply because of a failure to unders tand the bo ilerplate.  More strikingly,
however, when dealing with the government, contractors are bound by certain
regulatory requirements even if they inadvertently are left out of the contract.122 
This scenario simply could not exist in commercial practice where the existence of
a commerc ial contract depends on a “meeting of the minds” – mos t U.S. courts
refuse to enforce all or part of a contract that lacks mutual assent. 
The UCC and its evolution123 serve as  an instructive model with regard to the
development of commercial acquisition laws.124  The UC C’s drafters intended  to
create open-ended standards.125  They believed that by avoiding formalities, they
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could adjust the UCC to any changes in commercial practices.  S imilar goals are
reflected in the government’s regulation of commercial item acquisition.  FAR Part
12 grants contracting officials broad  discretion in awarding and so liciting
contracts.  This benefits commercial item acquisition by permitting broader
contracting official discretion,  greater flexibility, and less s tringent rules that might
better reflect p rivate business  practices .  Similarly, it may allow the government to
adapt to  the rapid changes in technology.
Ultimately, however, greater buyer discretion means less governmental
control over purchaser behavior. Less control entails sacrificing important policies,
the most obvious of which is  transparency.  Unfortunately, policymakers rare ly
recognize, let alone acknowledge, these tradeoffs when implementing new policies.
While each of the issues d iscussed  above suggests existing impediments to
the government’s adoption of commercial practices, a number of specific scenarios
also merit examination.  The exceptionalist view – justifying the government’s
unique behavior – seems unavoidable in certain significant circumstances.  
3.1. Providing Necessary Services
The government provides a wide range of vital services to the public, such
as defense, air traffic control, and emergency disaster relief.  In providing these
services, the government perceives the public as its customer, end user, or
beneficiary of the firm’s contractual performance.  In that context, the  government
126 For example,  the standard “Changes” c lause states that: “Failure to agree to
any adjustment [of the contrac t price and/or schedule] shall be a dispute  under the
Disputes clause. However, nothing  in this clause shall excuse the Contractor from
proceeding with the contract as changed.” 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1(e).
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takes the position that the public is unwilling to experience performance
interruptions for the sake of reso lving contractual differences.  Hence, the
government maintains the right to force contractors to proceed with their work
while their disputes  are pending.126  Ultimately, this suggests that the government
does not believe that conventional contract damages – in the form of money – can
make all of the parties, including the public as a party to the transaction, whole.
The longstanding requirement that a government contractor cannot stop
work on a government contract seems defensible in the limited contexts discussed
above.  The policy remains subject to criticism, however, because it applies to all
government contracts, regardless o f the urgency of performance.  As a result,
contrac tors  lose  valuable leverage – in the form of a threat  to stop work – in their
ongoing contractual relationship with the government.  As described below,
however, this example is merely symptomatic of a larger inequity in the parties’
footing.
3.1.1.  Anticipating Contingencies
The government recognizes that the universe of potential contingencies that
may arise during the performance of its contracts exceeds  its ability to anticipate
those contingencies.  Budgeting for contingencies is difficult and, as a matter of
127 vom Baur, supra note 109, at 250.
128 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1, -2, -3,  -4, -5; see also Checchi, supra note 103, at
363.
129 See U.C.C. § 2-209.
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policy, the government has deemed the cost of insuring against contingencies
untenable.  Rather than burdening the public fisc (or the public) with the cos ts
associated  with anticipating contingencies, the government simply self-insures.  In
so doing, the government discourages contractors from padding their bids or
proposals in anticipation of contingencies by promising to make the contractor
whole if certain types of contingencies  arise. Examples of this behavior include the
government’s right to unilaterally modify and terminate its contracts. 
One of the most dramatic rights granted by a s tandard c lause is the
government’s freedom to change contract terms without acquiring the consent of
the contractor.127  The standard “Changes” clause found in government contracts,
“grants the  government the unilatera l right to order a change in the contrac t and
allows the contractor an ‘equitable adjustment’ in exchange for this right.”128  
Although the UCC abolished the  common law pre-existing lega l duty rule,  in
which any modification of the contract needed consideration in order to be
enforceable, the UCC still requires the agreement of the two parties in order to be
binding.129
Moreover, the classic or archetypical government-unique contract clause
permits the government to terminate a contract for its own convenience, reimburse
130 JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., 1073 ADMINISTRATION OF
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1995).
131 See  48 C.F.R. § 12.403(a) (“Consequently, the requirements of Part 49 do
not apply when terminating contracts for commerc ial items and contracting officers
shall follow the procedures in this section.”); 48 C.F.R. § 12.403(b) (“The
contracting officer should exercise the Government's right to terminate a contract
for commercial items either for convenience or for cause only when such a
termination would be in the best interests of the Government.  The contracting
office r should consult with counse l prior to terminating for cause.”) (emphasis
added); see also 48 C .F.R . §  52.212-4(c) (The FAR now provides that changes in
commercial item contracts “may be made only by written agreement of the
parties.”);  48 C .F.R. §  52 .212-4(l). (New provisions allow convenience
terminations, but limit recoveries to a “percentage of the contrac t price reflecting
the percentage of the work performed.” ).
132 See 48 C.F.R. § 12.403 (“The contractor may demonstrate such charges
using its standard  record keeping system and is not required to comply with the
cost accounting standards or the contract cost principles in Part 31. The
Government does not have any right  to audit the contractor's records so lely
because of the termination for convenience.”)
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the contractor for work done (plus its costs of closing out the contract), provide
profit on the work performed, and avoid liability for the contractor’s anticipated
profit. “The concept . . . was developed primarily as a means to end  the massive
procurement efforts that accompanied major wars[,]”130 but it  subsequently
morphed to include all government contracts.
Granted , to some extent, the government has been willing to limit its rights
under these clauses in the acquisition of commercial items.131  For example,
commercial contractors benefit from a reduced cost information disclosure when
negotiating a termination se ttlement.132  Although the legislature could  eliminate
this unusual, exceptional contrac tual power, it would be ludicrous to expect the
government to abandon such a right.  Further, while some segment of the business
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community might benefit from a change , the  cumulative  risk to the public w ould
outweigh any such benefit.
3.1.2. Developmental Work
Much of what the government buys legitimately requires  that the
government invest in research and development (which entails risk) without an
expected financial return on that investment.  The commercial marketplace also
constantly innovates and develops new  technology.  For example, Boeing and
Airbus – in a highly competitive environment – attempt to anticipate consumer
demand and compete to develop new aircraft (whether larger, faster, more fuel
efficient, quieter, safer, or more comfortable) in the hope that their superior
product will result in increased airline orders which, in turn, will lead to greater
profits for shareholders and incentive payments to executives and employees. 
While, arguably, airlines and passengers describe their needs, it is the commercial
firm (here Boeing and Airbus) that determines whether its profits will be
maximized by developing new aircraft or risking that, through lack of innovation, a
new competitor may emerge.  Conversely, the government’s research and
development investments are  not market d riven.  For example, the government
develops new submarines (more lethal, faster, quieter, safer, etc.) to defend ocean
borders, neutralize ever-evolving enemy sea power, and projec t a nuclear threat. 
Thus, without being subjec ted to market forces,  the government s tates its
133 James C. Roan, Jr., Streamlining Government Acquisition  (Or, ‘Why Can’t
the Government Figure Out How to Use Com mercia l Practices?’), ARMY LAW. 58,
61 (May 1995).  
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requirements  and compensates contractors to meet its  needs.   The contras t is
dramatic.
In the commercial world, industry normally funds its own research
and development, and companies develop products at their own
expense with the idea that demand for the product will enable them
to recoup their investment and, hopefully, make a profit. . . .
[W]hat company would be willing to do that if only one buyer –
the government –  would be  interested in its product, and the
development costs run into the billions? . . . . We must distinguish
between commercial . . .  items  . . .  and items  that  must be spec ially
developed for the military. . . . 133
All of this, arguably, justifies the need for different contractual vehicles and
pricing policy, introduced above.  Boeing develops a new plane and determines
what price  the market w ill bear.  The government describes a nuclear submarine
and, while the private  sec tor a ttempts to price the e ffort,  the government frequently
constra ins true market pric ing by publicly disclosing its availab le funding (which is
determined by the legislature, not consumers).   To the extent that such a
relationship entails high degrees of risk, greater pricing flexibility is required,
hence the use of cost reimbursement contracting.  Due to the unusual risks
associated with cost reimbursement contracting, other policies are implicated, such
as the need for significant financial disclosures by contractors and governmental
audit rights.
134 In defense contracts,  the Government obtains unlimited rights in (1) da ta
pertaining to an item, component,  or process deve loped exc lusively with
Government funds; (2) studies, analyses, test data, or similar data produced as an
element of the performance of a contract; (3) data crea ted exclusively with
Government funds; (4) form, fit, and function data; (5) data necessary for
installation, operation, maintenance, or training purposes; etcetera.  See 48 C.F.R. §
227.7103-5(a).
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Similarly, issues involving intellectual property arise.  At one level, these
issues resemble concerns experienced in the commercial marketp lace.  In the same
manner as commercial airlines or shipping concerns, the government procures 
hardware (such as an aircraft carrier) and plans to have its own employees (for
example, sailors or Seabees) service and repair the complex product.   But the
government wants, and arguably requires , additional rights.  For example, the
Navy may purchase components that it uses in other, similar platforms (such as
aircraft engines or advanced radar or communications or weapon delivery systems)
directly from one firm and provide them as “government-furnished property” to an
airframe manufacturer.  Unlike the scenario where an airframe builder (such as
Boeing) buys engines directly from a supplier, the government requires intellectual
property – sometimes as little as form, fit and function data, sometimes much more
– from each of the contractors.  Further, the government frequently pre fers to
obtain unlimited rights in technical data so that it subsequently can establish
multiple sources for spare or repair parts.134
Accordingly, government-unique intellectual property rights long have been
blamed for inhibiting the government’s access to technological advances made by
135 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy
(July 17, 2001) (statement of Jack  Brock,  Managing Director of Acquisition and
Sourcing Management).
136 48 C.F.R. § 12.211 (“The contracting officer shall presume that data
delivered under a contract for commercial items was developed exclusively at
private expense. When a contract for commercial items requires the delivery of
technical data , the contracting officer shall include appropriate provisions  and
clauses delineating the rights in the technical da ta in addenda to the so licitation and
contract”).
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the private sector.  Many commerc ial companies c laim to avoid dea ling with the
government in order to protect their intellectual property rights.135  Under the
commercial procedures , however, the government is permitted to  acquire “only the
technical data  and the rights in that da ta customarily provided to the public with a
commercial item or process.”136  While the  priva te sector recognizes this
concession is a step in the right direction, the government must cover much
additional ground.
3.1.3.  M ilitary Service Contracting: An Anecdote
As the government continues to contract out what it perceives as commercial
services – driven by a strong executive mandate, as discussed above – defense
support contracting raises  unique concerns.  Today, as more commerc ial firms
perform military logistics and troop support, concerns arise regarding the status
and activities of contractor personnel during mobilization or on the battlefield. 
Michael Davidson, an Army attorney, presents a thoughtful list of the advantages
and disadvantages of this regime.  The many advantages to using civilian
contractor support include: (1) the ability to use (and maintain) scarce  military
137  Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues
Assoc iated with C ivilian Contrac tors on  the Battle field, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J 233,
263-267 (2000).
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personne l resources  primarily to fight and defend; (2) the  potential for cos t savings
(although this is difficult to demonstrate  empirically); and (3) the flexibility for the
military to project its limited force further and to different locations .  At the same
time, disadvantages of greater reliance on a civilian workforce include: (1) reduced
opportunities  for uniform personne l to acquire technical and managerial skills
associated  with support and logistics; (2) absence of power (other than monetary
incentives) to maintain, d irect, and control the workforce in unpleasant and
dangerous  conditions; (3) a  reduced  ability to defend rear areas o r supplement
forward forces w hen necessary; and (4) increased likelihood that c ivilians  will
become prisoners of war (under the Geneva convention) or be injured, tortured, or
killed.137 Only time and experience will tell whether the advantages outweigh the
disadvantages.
138 See, e.g ., 48 C.F.R. §§ 19 (small business programs); 22 (labor law
compliance); 23 (environment, conservation, occupational safety, and drug-free
workplace); and 25 (domes tic preferences); for additional discussion, see Steven L.
Schooner, Mixed Messages: Heightened Complexity In Social Policies Favoring
Small Business Interests, 8 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. CS78 (1999).
139  Although voluminous reports detail the percentage of participation in the
procurement process by various groups – such as small, disadvantaged , or women-
owned businesses – little empirical information suggests that this participation
derives from existing statutory preferences or programs.  See generally  Federal
Procurement Data System at <http://fpds.gsa.gov/>.
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3.2. The Pervasive Effect of Social and Economic Policy
In the  U.S.,  history sugges ts that the most daunting aspec t of completely
reforming the U.S. procurement system is the well established propensity of
elected officials to impose social policies upon the procurement process.138  It is
axiomatic that these social po licies impose significant cos ts upon the procurement
system, regardless of whether they achieve their intended purpose.139
The tension between social policies and commercial purchasing has
materialized in several different ways.  First, after the 1990’s acquisition reforms,
contracting officials learned that pleasing the program manager (or end user)
merited increased emphasis.  Accordingly, it seems natural for government buyers
to disregard  these social policies to achieve greater customer sa tisfaction.  Today,
140 Program managers or “customers” rarely appreciate the value of
legislative ly mandated socia l polic ies that may delay or deter their ability to obtain
needed supplies or services.  Steven L. Schooner, Feature Comment – Buying the
"Black Beret": Balancing Customer ‘Needs’ and Socio-Economic Policies, 43
GOV’T CONTRACTOR (Fed. Pubs. Inc.) ¶ 158 (April 18, 2001).
141 DAVID BEETHAM, 32 BUREAUCRACY (2d ed. 1996).
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for government buyers, customer service comes first, legislatively-mandated
procurement policies finish second.140
Ultimately, however, something has to give.  Either Congress must stop
legislating soc ial po licy, or it must recognize  that  more  commerc ial purchasing w ill
render these policies ineffective (or, at very least, shift the burden of these policies
onto the less  commercial procurements).   Promulgating complex rules  but
permitting them to be ignored is not a hea lthy recipe for public trust.
A businessman who bends the rules  is showing
flexibility, and a rule book which is highly general allows
scope for individual initiative in the pursuit of profit.  A
civil servant who does the same is guilty of misconduct,
and a rule book which a llows large disc retion to the
official in dealings with the public is inviting
arbitrariness in the treatment of d ifferent cit izens.  Rule
keeping is not a  means to the  end of profit . . . but a value
in itself.141
If this analogy does not ring true on first reading, substitute the word “contractors”
for “citizens.”  This subs titution implicates citizenship at a  number of different
levels.  Some contractors, particularly small businesses, are individual citizens. 
Larger contractors are owned, managed, and staffed by citizens, whose
employment may depend upon certa in contracts.  Finally, citizens own s tock in
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companies  that are affected by government purchas ing decisions.  In these, and
other scenarios, affected cit izens have reason to expect that the government will
not be arbitrary in dealing with them or others similarly situated. 
3.3. Oversight and Enforcement
Because government p rocurement involves  expenditure o f public funds, the
evolution towards more commercial purchasing implicates certa in oversight and
enforcement issues.  Ultimately, the issue can be distilled to the simple question of
how much the public is willing to pay to constrain purchaser and seller behavior,
particularly avoiding fraud, waste, and abuse .  Commercial firms, concerned with
the bottom line, have sufficient incentives to minimize waste.  Yet the model is not
completely apt due to the government’s obsession with maintaining the appearance
of propriety in disbursing the public’s tax dollars.
For example,  consumers  and commercial firms frequently select those with
whom they do business  – both in the short and long-term – based upon indefinite
and even subconscious preferences and perceptions.  This implies, of course, that
consumers  and businesses frequently avoid , or implicitly discrim inate against,
certain firms for both legitimate and less legitimate reasons.  Conversely, the U.S.
procurement system is structured to deny buyers a level of unfettered discretion
that might tempt them to show favoritism or engage in corrupt behavior.  “The
distrust of contracting officials that is reflected in the complex and rigid rules that
142 Hearing Before the Committee on Small Business United States House of
Representatives (August 3, 1995) (Statement of Steven Kelman, Administrator for
Federal Procurement Policy).
143 Schooner, “Fear of Oversight,” supra note 119  (offering empirical data
describing, and a provisional list of explanations for, the reduction in external
monitoring).
144 Defense Waste and Fraud Camouflaged as Reinventing Government,
availab le at <http://www.pogo.org/mici/money/camrpt.htm> (citing Elizabeth
Becker, Big Lapses Found in Pentagon's Security-Clearance Check, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, August 17, 1999).
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now govern how competitions are conducted  has ramifications that a ffect the
acquisition process from the very beginning -- back to  the point when the
specifications and evaluation criteria are developed.”142
One of the most striking consequences of the U.S. procurement reforms of
the 1990s was  the reduction of both external and  internal oversight over the
process.143  Although most in private industry cheered this development, others a re
less  sanguine.  “Drastically cutting oversight personnel b linds the government in
its oversight of tens of billions of dollars of contracts  each year. This serves only to
make the government and the taxpayer highly vulnerable to exploitation by an
industry with a blemished track record.”144  This author worries that, as oversight
of government spending has plummeted, our reformed, and surely more
commercial, buying regime lacks meaningful oversight and rapidly is propagating
a culture seemingly defined by lawlessness.
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4. Conclusion: Emphasis on “More Commercial”  Practices: Progress and a
Happy Medium
A host of reasons justify the U.S. government’s efforts to act more like
commercial businesses.  Critics of the current system perceive that commercial
purchasing will lead to greater efficiency in government. Reform advocates  assert
that commercial-style buying will strengthen the responsiveness and efficiency of
the procurement system.   Increased privatization and  contracting out further serve
the widespread desire to reduce the size of the existing government bureaucracy. 
Buyers, sellers, and end users (o r customers ) continue to express longstanding
frustration with government-unique aspects of the procurement system.  And, of
course, there remains an ephemeral (if not chimerical) expectation that commercial
purchasing will generate savings (either from better pricing or administrative
efficiency).
When the government wants something that the commercial marketplace
provides, it seems logical to buy commercial.  Hence, there seems little debate that
the government should buy commercial-off-the-shelf goods whenever possible. 
Yet, when the government wants to buy something that conventional consumers or
businesses do not want (olive drab parachutes, blue polyester uniforms), cannot
afford (space stations), or should not be entitled to possess (nuclear weapons,
aircraft carriers, armored tanks, etc.), absolute reliance on the commercial
marketplace seems  naïve and counterproduc tive.  The grey area, not surprisingly,
falls in the middle.
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If there is  a lesson to be lea rned  from the 1990’s procurement reforms, it
may be as simple as this: no simple, universal solution will solve the government’s
purchasing problems.  It simply may prove impossible to maintain a uniform
procurement system primarily defined by its size, breadth, and diversity.  In the
U.S.,  we recognize that a consumer may employ different techniques , and
implicate unrelated legal regimes, when he or she obtains groceries, a new
automobile, real estate or residential construction, or in-home child-care services. 
So too, the government must employ different techniques and, in so doing, balance
competing po licies.  Knowing when to purchase commercial items and w hen to
employ commercial purchasing techniques will enable the  U.S. purchasing regime
to become more efficient.  But learning to recognize when commercial models are
inappropriate  will prove equa lly important to maintaining the public’s trus t in the
procurement system.
